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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN RUSSO and ROBERT RUSSO, ] 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ] 
v . ] 
BRIDLEWOOD CORPORATION, ] 
Defendant-Respondent. ] 
) Case No. 860457 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues of law are presented within the Brief 
of Appellant: 
(1) Did the Bridlewood Corporation, as seller, 
intentionally conceal from the Russos information that the 
restaurant property contained significant soil stability and 
slope defects? A material component of this legal issue is 
whether or not the Russos1 retained real estate agent acquired 
sufficient notice or knowledge from the seller's listing agent of 
the slope stability defects on the property so that the 
Russos1 damages are not the proximate result of the seller's 
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intentional concealment of material facts. 
(2) Did the Bridlewood Corporation, as seller, either 
individually or through its listing real estate agent, 
negligently fail to investigate and to disclose to the Russos 
that the restaurant property contained significant slope 
stability defects? A material component of this legal issue is 
whether or not the Russos1 retained real estate agent 
acquired sufficient notice or knowledge from the seller's listing 
agent of the soil stability defects so that the Russos' damages 
are not the proximate result of the negligent conduct of the 
seller or of its listing agent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Russos commenced this action following their February 
6, 1984 purchase from the Bridlewood Corporation of certain 
improved commercial real property upon which the Russos 
intended to operate a restaurant business. The Russos 
discovered during the Spring of 1984, for the first time, that 
slope slippage had occurred on the east side of the restaurant 
property related to general slope failure along the west side of 
the adjacent Birch Creek gully. 
A two day non-jury trial was held in the Weber County 
District Court from May 22, 1986 through May 23, 1986, the 
Honorable David E. Roth, District Judge, presiding. The case was 
tried to the trial court upon the multiple theories Bridlewood's 
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intentional concealment of material facts and of its negligent 
failure to investigate and to disclose material facts both 
individually and through its listing agent, Robert Penton. The 
trial court entered a June 11, 1986 Memorandum Decision which 
concluded in material part that: 
(1) The RussosT real estate agent was provided with 
sufficient information of slope failure on the property from the 
seller's listing agent to obligate him to disclose this acquired 
information to the Russos and to further investigate, 
(2) The acquired knowledge of the Russos1 real estate 
agent was fully chargeable to them as was the acquired knowledge 
of the seller's listing agent. 
(3) The failure of the Russos' real estate agent to 
disclose to them the information which he had acquired and his 
failure to further investigate was the sole proximate cause of 
the Russos' damages. (Tr. at 101 - 104). 
Conforming Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment were 
entered on August 12, 1986 by which each cause of action within 
the Plaintiffs' Complaint was dismissed, no cause of action. 
(Tr. at 112 - 118, 147). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The real property in this action is located at 440 East 
4400 South, Ogden, Utah. The property contains .75 acres and is 
rectangular in shape with its south facing length fronting on 
4400 South. A restaurant designed and furnished rectangular 
shaped 3,700 square foot cinderblock and frame building is 
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located on the property. The south facing length of the building 
faces 4400 South. An asphalt surface parking lot extends from 
the front of the building approximately seventy-five feet to 4400 
South. The east side boundary of the property is marked by chain 
link fence which traverses the crest of the west slope of the 
Birch Creek Gully. The Birch Creek Gully is a deep and steep 
sided intermittent stream created gully. The gully extends at 
extreme depth for several hundred yards north of the restaurant 
property to State Road 89 and for several hundred yards south of 
the restaurant property and beyond 4400 South. A waterslide 
complex has been built on the Birch Creek slope of the property 
immediately to the north of and adjacent to the restaurant 
property. An outside walk-in freezer unit approximately eight 
feet by sixteen feet is located along the north (rear) wall of 
the restaurant building. The east end of this freezer unit is 
flush with the east wall (side) of the building. The freezer 
unit is located upon a concrete pad of identical size dimensions. 
The northeast corner of the building is approximately twenty feet 
from the crest of the west slope of the Birch Creek Gully. The 
east side yard has neither been graded nor asphalted with the 
result that it is neither a public access nor personnel access to 
the rear entrance of the building. All personnel access to the 
rear (north side) of the building is made from the west side of 
the property which is asphalted and which further functions as a 
road right-of-way to the adjacent waterslide property. 
The liability and damages issues in this action derive 
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from a pattern of Birch Creek Gully slope failure along the east 
side yard of the restaurant property. This failure pattern 
extends for several hundred yards to the south and to the north 
of the restaurant property along the west slope of the Birch 
Creek Gully. 
During those times material to this action, the slope 
failure pattern along the east side of the restaurant building 
had been evidenced by a radiating line of earth slippage which 
began in the parking lot approximately twenty feet in front 
(south) of the building and approximately twenty feet from the 
crest of the Birch Creek Gully. The slippage line extended 
approximately thirty feet in an unbroken line parallel to the 
crest of the Birch Creek Gully to where it intersected the 
building's east foundation wall about ten feet from its northeast 
corner. The slippage continued under the east end of the walk-in 
freezer concrete pad, northward across the adjacent waterslide 
property and further northward into the hard surfaced 
right-of-way of State Road 89. 
At the time of the May 1986 trial, the slippage had 
increased to an approximate two foot depth where it intersected 
the building's foundation and thereafter passed under the 
concrete freezer pad and beyond the north property boundary. 
Slope failure along the west slope of the Birch Creek 
Gully is continuing and will encroach further westward into the 
restaurant property. (Ex.7, 22). The result of this continuing 
-5-
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slope failure along the east side of the property is that major 
slope failure is projected to occur under the foundation of the 
restaurant building within the following ten years. (Ex. 7, 22, 
23). This event will structurally condemn the facility. (Ex. 7). 
The known condition of the property has disqualified it for 
landslide/disaster insurance coverage, for long term secured 
lender financing and has rendered the property unsuitable for a 
replacement structure which can comply with controlling zoning 
ordinance set back requirements for the usable boundaries of the 
property. (Tr. at 349, 365 - 366). The combined impact of slope 
failure, disqualification from insurance coverage, and 
disqualification from secured lender financing has rendered the 
property financially worthless to a prospective purchaser (Tr. at 
365 - 366; Ex. 14). The Russos have applied in excess of 
$19,000.00 toward the improvement of the building, for the 
acquisition of restaurant equipment, for advertising signs and 
fixtures and have paid real property taxes totalling 06,068.40 
for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. (Tr. at 328 - 334; Ex. 11, 12, 
13, 17). 
The Defendant, Bridlewood Corporation, sold the restaurant 
property to the Russos on February 6, 1984 for $177,000.00 
against which the Russos applied a $20,000.00 down payment. (Tr. 
at 310; Ex. 15). Terms of sale provide for sixty monthly 
installments of $1,363.05 commencing April 1, 1984 with the 
entire unpaid balance of principal and interest to be paid in 
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full not later than March 1989. (Ex. 25). 
Bridlewood Corporation is a foreign corporation with its 
principal place of business in Illinois. The sole contact which 
the corporation has had with the State of Utah has been its 
ownership of the restaurant property. The president of 
Bridlewood Corporation and its sole shareholder is Clinton E. 
Frank. For purposes of this litigation, the conduct of the 
corporation has always been the conduct of its president, Mr. 
Frank, who is also an Illinois resident. 
The restaurant property was placed by Frank for sale 
during August 1980 with Rick J. Wadraan, an Ogden, Utah real 
estate broker. (Tr. at 193). The building, outside freezer 
unit, parking lot and boundary lines appeared then as they did at 
trial. Frank allowed the Wadraan listing to expire without being 
renewed on December 31, 1983. He thereafter placed the listing 
with Realty World Abide and one of its Ogden, Utah agents, Robert 
Penton. (Tr. at 238). The Realty World Abide listing went into 
effect on January 1, 1984 and was in place when the property was 
sold to the Russos on February 6, 1984. 
The original listing agent, Rick Wadraan, discovered the 
radiating soils slippage line on the east side of the restaurant 
building soon after he acquired his August 14, 1980 listing. 
(Tr. at 199). At that time, the depth of the slippage was not 
more than six inches where it intersected the northeast corner 
area of the building. (Tr. at 201). Wadman further observed that 
-7-
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this radiating slippage line had cracked the east end of the 
concrete pad for the walk-in freezer but no further damage was 
evident. (Tr. at 203). 
Wadman ordered from Frank, during November 1982, a written 
real estate appraisal for the restaurant property. (Tr. at 199). 
The completed November 1982 appraisal provided in material part: 
. . . 
there is a crack in the earth on the east side. 
There has been some slippage here and the separation 
extends back to and through the waterslide in the back. 
This slippage occurred several years ago. One cannot 
predict what will happen in the future, but it may 
have stabilized. (Ex. 3; Tr. at 162 - 163). 
The appraisal report likewise contained a photograph of the 
described condition. (Ex. 3). 
Wadman did not believe that the November 1982 appraisal 
impacted adversely the value or desirability of the property in 
that the report described a condition which had existed unchanged 
on the property since August 1980. (Tr. at 200). A copy of the 
report was received by Frank. (Tr. at 164). 
Wadmanfs first concern with slope stability on the east 
side of the property occurred during June 1983 when he inspected 
the property at that time. (Tr. at 200). The radiating slippage 
line continued to be approximately thirty feet long but the depth 
of the slippage had deteriorated to a depth of not less than one 
foot where the slippage line intersected the buildingfs 
foundation and the east end of the concrete paid had completely 
fractured and had dropped approximately one foot. (Tr. at 201 -
-8-
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204). Wadman saw that a significant length of the west slope of 
the Birch Creek Gully was slipping over an area about two hundred 
yards south of 4400 South and northward from the restaurant 
property to State Road 89. (Tr. at 204 - 205). Wadman coupled 
his observations of the ^ restaurant property and of the west slope 
of the Birch Creek Gully with recently received television and 
newspaper reports that the heavy snow fall during the 1983/84 
winter season was then producing slope movement along the length 
of the Birch Creek Gully. (Tr. at 201). 
Wadman immediately telephoned Frank and described to Frank 
what he had seen on the restaurant property within the adjacent 
Birch Creek Gully area and what he had learned about the Birch 
Creek Gully from television reports and newspaper articles. (Tr. 
at 207). Wadman next sought by telephone the advise of a 
consulting engineer, a Mr. Adamson. (Tr. at 207). Adamson told 
Wadman that the entire west slope of the Birch Creek Gully was 
"sluffing off, as a general rule". (Tr. at 207 - 208). 
Frank traveled to Utah on July 24, 1983 and personally 
inspected the restaurant property with Wadman. (Tr. at 208). 
The inspection lasted approximately one-half hour. (Tr. at 209). 
Wadman showed Frank the radiating slippage line on the property 
and informed him that its depth had doubled since November 1982. 
(Tr. at 208). Wadman again recounted to Frank the contents of 
the newspaper articles and television segments which had covered 
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to date the slope failure occuring along the west slope of the 
Birch Creek Gully drainage area and his own observations of the 
west slope of the gully. Wadman further showed Frank, for the 
first time, an area of soil erosion in the vicinity of the 
northeast corner of the property. (Tr. at 210 - 211). Erosion 
had been created by water flowing from a roof drainpipe, the end 
of which was placed at the crest of the gully. (Tr. at 210). 
The erosion was located under the pipe and extended for a 
distance down the face of the gully's west slope. (Tr. at 210 -
212). Wadman told Frank that both the value and desirability of 
the property could be adversely impacted by what they had each 
observed, notwithstanding that purchase offers were being 
received for the property. (Tr. at 211). Wadman informed Frank 
that his listing real estate broker obligations required him to 
disclose to each subsequent prospective purchaser what he knew of 
the nature and extent of the slope failure and erosion condition 
along the east boundary of the restaurant property. (Tr. at 
210). 
Wadman inspected for approximately twenty minutes the 
restaurant property with Adamson on July 29, 1983 and after Frank 
had returned to Illinois. (Tr. at 212). Adamson informed Wadman 
that the slope failure along the east boundary of the property 
was part of the general slope failure pattern then occuring along 
the entire west slope of the Birch Creek Gully drainage area and 
-10-
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that the slippage pattern on the property and along the west 
slope of the gully could not be corrected but was symptomatic of 
the saturated clay soils of the gully sliding horizontally along 
the underlying hard rock strata. (Tr. at 212 - 213). Adamson 
stated that the slope failure had been ongoing for the past fifty 
to one hundred years and could damage the restaurant building if 
the area continued to receive heavy water years like the 1983/84 
winter. (Tr. at 213). Adamson concluded that the east side of 
the restaurant property could experience further slope failure 
within one year or not for the next fifty to one hundred years -
it was a judgment call that he as not willing to predict. 
(Tr. at 213). The engineer emphasized that the placement of fill 
dirt on the east side of the property to return it to grade and 
limited asphalt resurfacing would be cosmetic repair only which 
would not defeat the underlying slope failure mechanisms. (Tr. 
at 213 - 214). 
Wadman telephoned Frank in Illinois and told him the 
contents of his meeting with Adamson. (Tr. at 214). Wadman then 
recommended that Frank cosmetically repair for an estimated 
$15,000.00 the east side of the property with fill dirt, extend 
the roof drainpipe beyond the crest of the gully and asphalt 
resurface. Frank refused this proposal because he wanted the 
property sold in its then condition without further financial 
expenditures or financial demands being imposed. (Tr. at 216) 
Frank did not return to the restaurant property following his 
-11-
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I 
July 24, 1983 Utah trip until after the commencement of this 
action. 
Robert Penton became the listing agent for the restaurant 
property on January 1, 1984. (Tr. at 238). All listing 
documents were exchanged by mail between Frank and Penton. (Tr. 
at 239)- Penton never met Frank personally during the time he 
held the listing for the restaurant property or when it was sold 
to Russos on February 6, 1984. (Tr. at 238). All communication 
between the two men was by telephone or by written correspondence. 
Frank never disclosed to Penton, at any time, his knowledge of 
slope failure on the restaurant property and along the west slope 
of the Birch Creek Gully drainage as acquired from Wadman and 
from his July 24, 1983 inspection of the property with Wadman. 
(Tr. at 243 - 244). At the time the restaurant property listing 
was obtained by Penton, approximately two feet of snow had 
accummulated on the ground, the building had been vacant for 
several months and the parking lot was snow covered and 
inaccessible. (Tr. at 241 - 242). Penton did not inspect the 
property outside the restaurant building at the time the lisitng 
was obtained and had no knowledge of the earth slippage and soils 
erosion conditions along the east side of the building. (Tr. at 
243 - 244). 
Robert Russo learned during January 1984 that the 
restaurant property was listed for sale. He retained Mr. Steven 
Brown, a real estate agent with the Wardley Corporation of Ogden, 
Utah to arrange for an inspection of the property. (Tr. at 281). 
-12-
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Brown and Robert Russo thereafter inspected, by themselves, the 
restaurant property. (Tr. at 283). The parking lot at that time 
was inaccessible and the entire property was under a two foot 
snow cover. (Tr. at 317). Their inspection included, in 
material part, an approximate twenty minute walk around and 
inspection of the exterior of the restaurant building. (Tr. at 
283, 317). Neither Robert Russo nor Brown saw under the heavy 
snow cover any evidence of slope failure on the east side of the 
building or any slope failure along the west slope of the Birch 
Creek Gully in either direction from the restaurant property 
as had been observed by Frank and described to him by Wadman 
during June and July 1983• (Tr. at 286 - 287, 317). Each of 
them together saw, however, in the northeast corner area of the 
property and under the chainlink boundary fence a rather 
substantial slope erosion which had been caused by washout from 
the roof drainpipe (Tr. at 286, 317). This washout area on the 
gully slope extended from the crest of the gully, under the 
chainlink fence and for a rather a rather substantial distance 
along and into the surface of the gully slope. (Tr. at 287, 
317). 
The Russos thereafter tendered a purchase offer for the 
restaurant property which was accepted by Frank with a minor 
change in payment terms. (Tr. at 288 - 290). The closing was 
scheduled by the parties1 realtors for February 6, 1984. (Tr. at 
291). 
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Penton met with Wadman at the latterfs office 
approximately three to four days prior to the scheduled closing. 
(Tr. at 224, 249). Wadman and Penton do not agree why this late 
January 1*984 meeting occurred. (Tr. at 223 - 224, 249 - 250). 
Not disputed is that Wadman questioned Penton whether the Russos 
knew about the Birch Creek Gully slope failure along the east 
boundary of the property. (Tr. at 224 - 225, 250 - 252). The 
restaurant property was thereafter discussed for approximately 
one-half hour between the two men. (Tr. at 225, 252). Wadman 
told Penton that the Birch Creek Gully "as a whole was slipping11 
and that excessive slippage had occurred on the east side of the 
building within the 1982/83 winter. (Tr. at 224, 225). Wadmanfs 
trial testimony was that he described to Penton both the soils 
failure pattern on the restaurant property and the general 
slippage pattern along the west slope of the Birch Creek Gully in 
the same manner which he had observed it individually and with 
Frank during June and July 1983. (Tr. at 224 - 225). Wadman 
gave Penton Adamson's name and related to him Adamson's opinion 
of why slope failure was occuring on the east side of the 
restaurant property and in general along the west slope of the 
Birch Creek Gully and that further slope failure on the east side 
of the property could occur within the following year or not for 
the next fifty to one hundred years. (Tr. at 223 - 225). 
Wadman's January 1984 conversation with Penton was Penton's first 
notice from any source that the Birch Creek Gully and the east 
side of the restaurant property, in particular, had experienced 
-14-
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slope failure and slippage. (Tr. at 258). 
Pentonfs testimony of the January 1984 meeting largely, 
but not entirely, corresponds with Wadmanfs testimony. (Tr. at 
251 - 252). When Penton left Wadmanfs office, Penton understood 
that a certain amount of slippage had occurred under the concrete 
freezer pad located at the northeast corner of the building, that 
a crack was present in the asphalt surface of the parking lot to 
the front of the building and that Adamson had reassured Wadman 
that the soils slippage on the property would not cause future 
problems. (Tr. at 251). Penton's perception of Wadman's 
information was that soil slippage had occurred on the east side 
of the property, at the northeast corner of the building and was 
located under the east end of the concrete walk-in freezer pad. 
(Tr. at 252 - 253). Penton had no understanding from Wadman's 
information that slope failure was located anywhere else on the 
property other than under the concrete freezer pad or that the 
slippage on the east side of the property was part of general 
slope failure occurring along the length of the west slope of the 
Birch Creek Gully. (Tr. at 253 - 254). 
Penton traveled to the restaurant property during the late 
afternoon of the same day that he conversed with Wadman. (Tr. at 
254). Penton walked through the snow covered parking lot, along 
the east side of the building and directly to the east end of the 
concrete freezer pad. (Tr. at 254 - 257). Penton there saw that 
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a six to eight inch width of the east end of the concrete pad had 
fractured and had dropped off. (Tr. at 256 - 258). Penton 
additionally saw the slope erosion under the chainlink fence and 
at the crest of the gully in the northeast corner area of the 
property caused by washout from the roof drainpipe. (Tr. at 257). 
Penton did not look beyond the immediate area of the concrete pad 
for the reason that what he saw underneath the cement pad 
reconciled with his understanding of the slippage condition which 
Wadman had described to him. (Tr. at 258). Pentonfs 
investigation stopped at that point. (Tr. at 259). Penton saw 
no other evidence, through the two feet of snow cover, of slope 
failure on the east side of the property or in either direction 
from the property along the west slope of the Birch Creek Gully. 
(Tr. at 258 - 259). Penton's inspection of the east side of the 
restaurant property was made in street clothes and shoes and did 
not extend beyond five minutes. (Tr. at 256, 258). 
Penton telephoned Brown that same evening and within a ten 
minute to fifteen minute telephone call told him that he had 
conversed with Wadman earlier that day, that he had visited the 
property immediately following his conversation with Wadman and 
that he had seen at the northeast corner of the building the 
fractured concrete pad and the slippage underneath it. (Tr. at 
263). Penton gave Adamson's name to Brown and recommended that 
Brown disclose to Russos what Penton had seen on the property. 
(Tr. at 263). 
Brown understood Pentonfs telephoned information to mean 
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that Penton had discovered "a problem with slippage" in the 
northeast corner of the property. (Tr. at 291). Brown, however, 
understood from Pentonfs description that Penton was describing 
the slope erosion under the chainlink boundary fence and at the 
crest of the gully caused by washout from the roof drainpipe. 
(Tr. at 291 - 293). Brown further understood from Pentonfs 
telephone call that Adamson had informed Wadman that the east 
side of the property would not experience further slope failure 
for fifty to one hundred years. (Tr. at 291). Brown did not 
disclose to Russos the contents of his telephone conversation 
with Penton upon the basis that Brown did not believe the 
contents of the telephone call disclosed anything not already 
known to him and to Robert Russo. (Tr. at 293). 
Brown never contacted Adamson or Wadman for additional or 
clarifying information. (Tr. at 306). Similarly, Penton never 
contacted either Frank, Adamson or Wadman (a second time) after 
his late January 1984 conversation with Wadman to investigate 
further what any of those individuals knew about slope and soil 
conditions on the east side of the restaurant property. (Tr. at 
259, 260). 
All sales negotiations as well as the February 6, 1984 . 
closing were conducted without the real estate agents or the 
clients having personally met each other. (Tr. at 248, 249). 
The closing documents contain no disclosures of slope failure and 
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earth slippage conditions on the east side of the restaurant 
property. (Tr. at 270). The Russos learned of the earth 
slippage and slope failure conditions on the east side of the 
property during the Spring months of 1984 and after the snow 
cover had melted. (Tr. at 321). 
' SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Russos agree with the Findings of Fact entered by the 
trial court as is evidenced by their Statement of Facts in this 
appeal brief. (Tr. at 112 - 116). The Russos, however, 
specifically challenge paragraphs three through six of the trial 
court's Conclusions of Law upon which judgment was entered in 
this action in favor of the Defendant, Bridlewood Corporation, 
and against the Russos. (Tr. at 116 - 118). 
The Russos do not disagree with the trial court's 
conclusion of law that acts and omissions of their real estate 
agent, Steven Brown, are chargeable to them just as the 
Bridlewood Corporation is bound by the acts and omissions of its 
listing real estate agent, Robert Penton. What the Russos do 
challenge is that: 
(a) The contents of Penton's January 1984 telephone call 
to Brown was a sufficient disclosure by Bridlewood (the seller) 
to the Russos (the buyer) that the east boundary area of the 
restaurant property evidenced slope failure and earth slippage 
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which materially impacted the property's value and desirability. 
(b) The Bridlewood Corporation and its listing agent, 
Penton, discharged their obligations individually and together to 
properly investigate and to disclose the nature and extent of 
slope failure along the east boundary of the restaurant property 
by the contents of Pentonfs late January 1984 telephone call to 
Brown. 
Under the first argument, the disclosure obligation of the 
seller, Bridlewood Corporation, must be measured by what its 
president, Clinton E. Frank, knew and not merely by what its 
listing agent, Penton, disclosed to the Russos1 agent within the 
late January 1984 telephone conversation. Undisputed is that 
Frank never disclosed to Penton his knowledge and personal 
observations of slope failure on the east side of the property. 
Equally undisputed is that Penton discovered only a fraction of 
what Frank had personally observed and what Frank had been told 
by the original listing agent, Wadman. As a matter of law, 
Pentonfs disclosures within the January 1984 telephone call to 
Brown were inadequate and too incomplete to place Brown (and 
hence the Russos) on any form of realistic notice that the value 
and desirability of the restaurant property was adversely 
impacted by slope failure. 
The Russos' second argument is based upon the rule of law 
found within Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal.Rptr. 383 (Cal.App. 
1 Dist. 1984) that the duty of a listing broker to disclose facts 
includes the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably competent 
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and dilligent inspection of the listed real property and to 
disclose to the prospective purchaser all facts materially 
affecting the value and desirability of the property which such 
and investigation would disclose. 
The Russos submit that the cited rule of law is applicable 
equally to the seller in this action based upon the quantity and 
volume of slope failure information which Frank acquired from his 
personal observations of the property during July 1983 and from 
his June/July 1983 conversations with Wadman. Notwithstanding, 
Frank elected to both ignore the importance of this information 
and to further not disclose any part of it to either his listing 
agent, Penton, or to the Russos, 
The Russos independently urge that Penton (whose conduct 
is chargeable to Bridlewood) did not meet his disclosure 
obligation to the Russos by his fortuitous conversation with 
Wadman, his brief and narrowly focused inspection of the 
restaurant property and his telephone conversation with Brown. 
Penton discovered only a fraction of what Frank had personally 
observed upon the property and what Frank had been told by 
Wadman, the former listing agent. 
The court ruled as a matter of law that Pentonfs January 
1984 telephone conversation with Brown was a sufficient 
disclosure to put Brown on sufficient notice to further 
investigate and discover. Brown admittedly did not advise the 
Russos of his telephone call with Penton nor did he return to the 
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property for further inspection nor did he contact Adamson, the 
engineer, Brownfs conduct, however, is no different from 
Penton's. If Brown had a continuing obligation to investigate 
and disclose based upon the contents of Penton's January 1984 
telephone call, so did Penton. Notwithstanding the notice upon 
which Penton had been placed, Penton did not communicate with 
either Frank or Adamson to further discover the nature and extent 
of the slope failure on the propertyfs east boundary, nor did he 
return to the property with Brown for further inspection. The 
contents of Penton's January 1984 telephone call to Brown are 
inadequate and too incomplete to shift entirely to the Russos the 
obligation to discover the presence of slope failure on the 
property in the middle of winter and under a two foot deep snow 
cover. Principles of comparative negligence should apply to 
measure the quality of conduct between Bridlewood and the Russos 
both individually and through their respective realtors. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE BRIDLEWOOD CORPORATION, AS SELLER, INTENTIONALLY CONCEALED 
FROM THE RUSSOS, AS BUYER, INFORMATION THAT THE RESTAURANT 
PROPERTY CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT SOIL STABILITY DEFECTS. 
Liability for the intentional/reckless concealment 
of material facts typically derive from a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship existing between a plaintiff and defendant. 
The maintenance of a confidential or fiduciary relationship 
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between a plaintiff and defendant imposes upon the defendant the 
affirmative duty to speak and disclose. A defendant commits 
fraud through the concealment or suppression of material 
information when: 
(a) The defendant has concealed or suppressed a material 
fact; 
(b) The defendant was in a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship to the plaintiff; 
(c) The defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed 
a material fact with the intent to defraud the 
plaintiff; 
(d) The plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not 
have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed 
or suppressed fact; 
(e) Finally, as a result of the concealment or 
suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained 
damage. 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978), Elder v. 
Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963), Cooper v. 
Jevne, 128 Cal.Rptr. 724, (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1976). 
Liability for the intentional/reckless concealment of material 
facts has been invoked by this Court even where a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship has not existed between the plaintiff and 
the defendant. A legal duty to communicate will arise where an 
inequality of condition exists between the parties. The result 
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follows that if a party to a contract or transaction possesses 
material information not reasonably available to the other party 
and which the latter cannot discover by reasonable dilligence, 
the defendant has a legal duty to speak. The defendant's silence 
is actionable fraud. Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah2d 379, 
384 P.2d 802 (1963); Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah2d 279, 
373 P.2d 382 (1962); and see, Turnball v. Larose, 
702 P.2d 1331 (Alaska 1985); Mitchell v. Straith, 
40 Wash.App.405, 696 P.2d 609 (1985); Ogan v. Ellison, 
297 Or. 25, 682 P.2d 760 (1984), Lingsch v. Savage, 
19 Cal.Rptr. 201 (Cal.App. 1963). 
The absence of a "protected relationship" between a seller 
and a buyer in a real property transaction has produced the 
general rule that a seller is under no duty to a buyer to 
investigate and disclose material components within a real estate 
transaction, even if not known to the buyer. Cole v. Parker, 
5 Utah 2d 263, 300 0.2d 623 (1956); Secor v. Knight, 
716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986); Dugan v. Jones, 
615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). This general rule, however, is 
subject to significant exception. Utah applies the majority rule 
that where the seller knows facts materially affecting the value 
or desirability of the property which are known or accessible 
only to him and also knows that such facts are not known to or 
within the dilligent attention and observation of the buyer, the 
seller is under a duty to disclose those facts to the buyer. 
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Dugan v, Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) (negligent 
misrepresentation by the seller and listing broker regarding the 
amount of acreage for sale); Jardine v. Brunswick Corp, 
18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659 (1967) (theory of negligent 
misrepresentation approved - seller's disclosure obligation); 
Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963) 
(intentional concealment of material facts by vendor and listing 
agent regarding economic impact of noxious weed quarantine on 
real property being sold); Turnball v. Larose, 
702 P.2d 1331 (Alaska 1985) (intentional concealment of 
information by vendor and broker from purchaser that lessee 
intended to terminate lease thereby materially impairing the 
investment value of the real property to the purchaser); Sorrell 
v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220, 491 P.2d 1312 (1971) (purchaser of lot 
entitled to rescind because vendor intentionally concealed 
information that lot had been built up to street level by 
substantial placement of fill dirt); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 
56 Wash.2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960) (vendor intentionally failed 
to disclose to purchaser that residence was infested with 
termites - rescision allowed); Cooper v. Jevne, 
128 Cal.Rptr. 724 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.1976) (allegations that vendor 
and listing real estate agent knew of substantial structural 
defects in condominiums - intentional concealment action - rule 
of law approved that where seller and listing estate agent know 
facts materially affecting value and desirability of property 
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offered for sale and such facts are known or accessible only to 
them and seller and agent also know that such facts are not known 
to or within reasonable reach of the diligent attention and 
observation of the buyer, seller and listing agent are each under 
a duty to disclose such facts to buyer); Lingsch v. Savage, 
29 Cal.Rptr. 201, (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1963) (vendor and broker 
intentionally concealed from purchasers information that building 
was in state of disrepair and had been placed for condemnation 
by city officials - liability of vendor and real estate broker to 
purchaser for intentional concealment of material facts affecting 
value and desirability of property). 
The Utah Supreme Court decision in Elder v. Clawson, 
14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963) represents the application of 
fraud liability based upon the intentional concealment of 
material facts. The Court there held that the seller and its 
real estate agent had intentionally failed to disclose to the 
buyer the existence of a government imposed quarantine resulting 
from the presence of a noxious weed upon the real property which 
had been purchased by the defendant and the economic impact of 
that quarantine on the operation of the land. The seller's 
intentional suppression of these material facts within a 
transaction for which it possessed superior knowledge, not within 
the fair and reasonable reach of the defendant, was held to be 
fraud. 
The Russos accept the Findings of Fact entered by the 
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trial court in this action, (Tr. at 112 - 116). The Russos also 
agree that the acts and omissions of their real estate agent are 
chargeable to them just as Bridlewood is bound by the acts and 
omissions of its listing real estate agent, Robert Penton. The 
Russos challenge, however, those conclusions of law entered by 
the trial court that: 
(a) The contents of Pentonfs January 1984 telephone 
conversation to Brown was a sufficient disclosure by Bridlewood 
(the seller) to place the Russos (the buyer) on notice that slope 
failure conditions were present on the east side of the 
restaurant property which materially affected its value and 
desirability. 
(b) The Russos (through Brown) failed to meet their 
obligation to investigate the contents of Penton's disclosure 
which failure was the sole and proximate cause of their damages. 
The identified conclusions of law are inconsistent with 
and are not supported by the trial courtfs Findings of Fact. The 
cited conclusions of law ignore the knowledge of slope failure 
both on the restaurant property and within the Birch Creek Gully 
possessed by Bridlewood through its president, Clinton E. Frank. 
The disclosure obligation of the seller to the Russos must be 
measured by what Frank knew and not merely by what its listing 
agent disclosed to the seller's agent in a fifteen minute 
telephone conversation. Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 
690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984) (test for proximate cause is whether a 
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subsequent act, even if negligent, was reasonably foreseeable by 
the tort-feasor). Frank knew or was on notice of the following 
slope failure conditions both on the restaurant property and 
within Birch Creek Gully: 
(a) The west slope of the Birch Creek Gully was in 
general slipping because of heavy water saturation received from 
the 1982/1983 winter, 
(b) The slope failure mechanisms evident along the west 
slope of the Birch Creek Gully had produced the slope failure on 
the east side of the restaurant building, 
(c) The slope failure on the east side of the restaurant 
property was evidenced by a radiating slippage line which 
originated thirty feet from the building, ran parallel to the 
crest of the gully, intersected into the east wall of the 
building's foundation and thereafter traversed in a northward 
direction under the concrete freezer pad, across the north 
boundary of the restaurant property and into the adjacent 
waterslide property, 
(d) The slippage pattern had been stable from August 1980 
through November 1982, 
(e) The slippage pattern had doubled in depth from six 
inches to one foot at the point where it intersected the building 
and crossed under the concrete freezer pad during the 1982/8383 
winter, 
(f) An engineer (Adarason) projected that further slope 
failure on the east side of the building could occur the 
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following year or not for the next fifty to one hundred years - a 
projection largely dependent upon annual precipitation levels. 
Frank never disclosed to Penton his acquired information 
and personal observations of the restaurant property and of the 
Birch Creek Gully. What Penton understood about the east 
boundary of the restaurant property from his conversations with 
Wadraan is fractional compared to what Frank could have and should 
have disclosed. Penton understood only that: 
(a) Slippage was present under the concrete freezer pad 
located at the northeast corner of the building, 
(b) Adamson had been retained by Wadman to look at 
slippage on the property and Adamsonfs opinion was that the 
slippage would not cause future problems, 
(c) Brown should inform Russos that he had observed 
slippage at the northeast corner of the building which was 
located under the concrete freezer pad. 
Penton had no knowledge that what he had seen under the 
eight foot wide concrete freezer pad was part of a radiating 
slippage line which began south of the restaurant building, 
intersected into the building and thereafter traversed across the 
property's north boundary and continued across the adjacent 
property. He additionally had no knowledge that the slope 
failure mechanisms on the restaurant property existed generally 
along the west slope of Birch Creek Gully. Penton, like Brown 
and like the Russos could not see these failure conditions 
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because of the two foot snow cover. Penton's disclosure to Brown 
was inadequate and incomplete for what existed on the property. 
Brown justifiably confused Penton's disclosure of a slippage 
problem at the northeast corner of the building with the slope 
erosion caused by washout from the roof drainpipe. 
Brown didn't disclose the Penton telephone conversation 
with the Russos, he didn't communicate with Adarason and he didn't 
return to the restaurant property for further inspection for the 
same reason that Penton did not undertake such conduct - i.e., 
neither realtor had obtained a competent understanding of the 
slope conditions on the restaurant property and consequently 
neither realtor was concerned. The absence of a slope failure 
disclosure in the parties' February 6, 1984 closing documents 
further confirms this lack of concern between the realtors and 
their collective judgment that any such problems were merely 
cosmetic. 
The result follows that the contents of Penton's January 
1984 telephone conversation to Brown was not a sufficient 
disclosure to obligate the Russos either individually or through 
Brown to further investigate and discover by their own resources 
what Frank knew and intentionally failed to disclose. Penton 
could not disclose what he did not understand. The Russos submit 
that this lawsuit would never have been litigated if the slippage 
on the east side of the restaurant property had been limited to 
what Penton saw under the concrete freezer pad and what he 
understood the slippage problem to be. 
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POINT 2 
THE BRIDLEWOOD CORPORATION, AS SELLER, EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR 
THROUGH ITS LISTING REAL ESTATE AGENT NEGLIGENTLY FAILED TO 
INVESTIGATE AND TO DISCLOSE TO THE RUSSOS INFORMATION THAT THE 
RESTAURANT PROPERTY CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT SOIL STABILITY DEFECTS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has confirmed in Phillips v. J.CM. 
Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (1983) that a real property owner 
is subject to liability for the tortuous acts of its real estate 
agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Agency law 
further requires that the knowledge of a real estate agent is 
imputed to the employing real property owner. Telling v. Eastern 
and Pacific Enterprises, 
702 P.2d 1232 (Wash.App. 1985). 
Article Nine of the Code of Ethics of the National 
Association of Realtors provides: 
Realtors shall avoid exaggertion, misrepresentation, 
or concealment of pertinent facts. He has an 
affirmative obligation to discuss adverse factors 
that a reasonably competent and dilligent investigation 
would disclose. 
The Arizona Supreme Court has held in Baker v. Leight, 
370 P.2d 268 (Ariz. 1962) that an industry adopted code of ethics 
will constitute the standard of care from which negligent or 
fraudulent conduct can be measured and defined. 
Utah law confirms that no fiduciary duty runs from a 
listing real estate agent to the buyer. The listing agent is 
nonetheless required to meet standards of honesty, integrity, 
truthfulness, reputation and competency. Dugan v.Jones, 
615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). The application of this rule of law 
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has been fully defined by the California Court of Appeals in 
Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal.Rptr. 201, (Cal.App.1 Dist.1963) as 
follows: 
The real estate agent or broker representing the 
seller is a party to the business transaction. 
In most instances he has a personal interest in 
it and derives a profit from it. Where such agent 
or broker possesses, along with the seller, the 
requisite knowledge according to the foregoing 
decisions, whether he acquires it from, or 
independently of, his principal, he is under the 
same duty of disclosure. He is a party connected 
with the fraud and if no disclosure is made at all 
to the buyer by the other parties to the transaction, 
such agent or broker becomes jointly and severally 
liable with the seller for the full amount of the 
damages. It is not necessary that there be a 
contractual relationship between the agent or 
broker and the buyer. Cit.29 Cal.Rptr. at 205. 
The California state courts now apply the rule of law that 
on agent's duty of care in a real estate transaction includes the 
duty to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of 
property listed for sale in order to discover defects for the 
benefit of the buyer. The agent's failure to investigate, 
discover and thereafter disclose such material defects to a 
prospective purchaser of real property constitutes negligence. 
Easton v. Strassburger, 
199 Cal.Rptr. 383 (Cal.App.1 Dist.1984). This rule of law has 
similarly been applied by the New Mexico state courts in Gouveia 
v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Center, Inc., 101 N.M.572, 
686 P.2d 262 (N.M.App. 1984). The Utah Supreme Court has 
approved by dicta the Easton v. Strassburger neligence standard 
in Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986). 
The fact pattern in Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal.Rptr. 
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383 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1984) applies to the facts at issue in this 
action. The litigation involved residential property which was 
subjected to massive earth movement after purchase. Expert 
testimony established that earth slides had occurred because a 
portion of the property was fill dirt which had not been properly 
engineered and compacted. The property owners did not tell the 
purchaser about the slides or the corrective actions which had 
been taken by them prior to the sale date. Similarly, the owners 
did not inform the listing broker and agents of these same slide 
conditions and corrective actions. Notwithstanding that the 
listing broker and listing agents did not know of the property's 
earth movement history, the evidence established that the listing 
broker and agents were aware of certain "red flags" which should 
have indicated to them that soil problems were present. Even 
though the listing broker and agents were on notice of soil 
stability problems, neither of them requested soil stability 
evaluations for the property nor did any of them inform the buyer 
of the potential soil problems. The California Court of Appeals 
rejected the listing broker's argument that it should be liable 
only for concealment or suppression of facts known to it or its 
agent. The California Court of Appeals instead held that the 
duty of the listing real estate broker, to disclose facts 
includes the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably competent 
and diligent inspection of the property listed for sale and to 
disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting 
the value or desirability of the property that such an 
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investigation would reveal. The rationale for the California 
Court of Appeals ruling is stated as follows: 
• • • 
If a broker were required to disclose only known 
defects, but not also those that are reasonably 
discoverable, he would be shielded by his ignorance 
of that which he holds himself out to know. The 
rule thus narrowly construed would have results 
inimical to the policy upon which it is based. 
Such a construction would not only reward the 
unskilled broker for his own incompetence, but 
might provide the unscrupulous broker the 
unilateral ability to protect himself at the 
expense of the inexperienced and unwary who rely 
upon him. 199 Cal.Rptr. at 388. 
Russos submit that the negligence standard set forth 
within Easton v. Strassburger has direct application to 
Bridlewood (the seller) as well as to each of the real estate 
agents. Both Bridlewood as well as Penton and Brown should be 
obligated as a matter of law, to disclose to the Russos not only 
facts known to each of them but also to disclose facts which 
should be known to them through reasonable and competent 
investigation. Bridlewood should not be allowed to shield itself 
from its failure or Pentonfs failure to investigate and disclose 
because of the superseding conduct of Brown. Godesky v. Provo 
City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984) (Superseding cause should 
rarely, if ever, be a basis for dismissal or summary judgment -
test for proximate cause is whether a subsequent act, even if 
negligent, was foreseeable by the original tort-feasor); accord, 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). 
Brown's failure to independently investigate the 
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information contained within PentonTs January 1984 telephone call 
and to disclose such acquired information to the Russos may 
constitute negligence. Brown's conduct, however, was no 
different from that of Penton. Penton told Brown what Penton 
understood, however imperfectly, of his earlier conversation with 
Wadman. Brown did not further investigate and the trial court 
found as a matter of law that Brown's failure to act was 
negligent. Undisputed is that Penton himself did not further 
investigate. PentonTs duty of care as a listing agent cannot be 
any less than Brown's and indeed under the Strassburger rule 
Penton's duty is greater. The seller's obligation to disclose 
(which here includes the duty to investigate) should be measured 
by what Frank knew or should have known. Bridlewood should not 
be shielded from negligence liability because of Penton's 
superseding conduct or that of Brown's. The insufficiency of 
Penton's disclosures to Brown are certainly a foreseeable product 
of Frank's election to both ignore the importance of this 
information and to not disclose any part of it to either Penton 
or to the Russos. Comparative negligence standards should apply 
in this case. The application of comparative negligence 
standards should compare the conduct of Frank on the one hand and 
the conduct of Brown on the other. Bridlewood Corporation 
(through Frank) should not be allowed to have its standard of 
care measured merely by what Penton fortuitously discovered 
through Wadman and thereafter disclosed to Brown. What the 
Bridlewood Corporation knew or should have known can only be 
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properly defined by what its president, Clinton E. Frank, knew or 
should have known of slope failure conditions on the east side of 
the restaurant property, Russos submit that the clear result of 
such a comparative negligence application would be that the 
negligence of the Bridlewood Corporation would exceed any 
negligence attributable to the acts and omissions of the Russos 
through their real estate agent, Steven Brown. 
CONCLUSION 
The August 12, 1986 judgment entered in the District Court 
of Weber County, Utah should be reversed with this action 
remanded for trial on the merits or in the alternative for a 
directed judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. 
DATED this 24th day of December, 1986. 
lesp^tfully s&bmittec 
PATTERSOV AND W T T E R S O N 
dM^c^ 
PHILIP C\ PMTTERSON 
Attorney for\ Appellants 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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